September 11, 2001.
We grieve with Americans on the loss of thousands of lifes in the terrorist attack on WTC and Pentagon. This is the price that Americans paid for their uncompromized support of freedom and democracy around the World. This will not go in vain. Democracy will prevail!

September 11, 2001
The elections are over. Yugoslavian scenario did not played out. There were only 2000 protesters gathered on October Square that night. Would there be 100,000 – things could have developed differently. Hancharyk is calling for peaceful protests and law suites. Some youth organizations, Charter97, Kraj etc., are calling for radicalization. Putin has congratulated Belarusian people in Stalin’s glossary: ” I am thrilled with the self-sacrifice and courage of Belarusian people, who did not yielded to provocations from outside, and decided it’s fate in a way they felt necessary”. Well, after this he only needed to call for a hunt for Enemies of the People and we’d be back in the fifties. And be sure the manhunt has already started. As one of the posts on Belarusian political forum Draniki states:”All those cowards who were falsifying ballots with their hands, shaking out of fear, will now turn to revenge for their fear.” There will be prosecutions. But we will watch it closely and we will report any prosecution cases very much aloud. Justice will be served no matter how long do we need to fight for it.

September 10, 2001.
More than thousand cases of violations have been reported from elections. Opposition candidates never had a chance to appear on state TV, radio or in state controlled newspapers, while Lukashenka materials were continuosuly rolled on TV and Radio in violation of election laws. Internet, cell phones were blocked by regime to prevent people from reporting massive violations of law going around the country. Students were locked in dormitories until they woul give their voices into preliminary voting, which was much easier to manipulate. To say that Lukashenka is a choice of Belarusians as Russians do is to blatantly distort reality. European Union, in particularly OSCE official Mrs. Schroder, is claiming that no major elections violations have been observed. It has been a known position of EU expressed by Mr. Wic months ago that dissolving totalitarian Belarus in pseudo-democratic Russia will take care of “Belarusian problem” for EU. As far as we know only United States of America and Sweden have expressed clear and uncompromized position of support for free democratic Belarus. We don’t know what will happen next – several hundreds of activists have barricaded themselves in the Palace of Labor Unions and raised white-red-white historic Belarusian flag. The same flag that was raised in 1918 in Minsk by Belarusian Democratic Republic, later crushed by Bolsheviks. Labor unions are calling for all-Belarusian strike for today. But whatever happens, it is clear that the days of the Dictator are counted. This outrage can not go on much longer.

Uladzimir Hancharyk talks to his supporters on the night after elections.

September 9, 2001.
Belarusian Presidential Elections have been held today at 11.30PM in Minsk Belarus.
Central Elections Committee has announced preliminary results:

These official data are in drastic contradiction with independent estimates: Lukashenka – 44%, Hancharyk – 40% and Hajdukevich – 7%. The only direct account of observer that I’ve heard confirms this numbers – 39% for Hancharyk and 44% for Lukashenka at his elections station in Minsk. According to the statement of opposition leader Hancharyk this calls for a second round of elections.

It is now 10PM in Minsk, Belarus. The first round of presidential elections has ended at 8PM. The winner will be the one who had obtained 50% + 1 voice or more voices. If none – second round of elections will be conducted. The participation of the population was very high > 82.55%. According to independent analysts this should bring approximately 62%/37% victory to opposition leader Uladzimir Hancharyk. The percentage There is a big argument over the number of preliminary votes. The regime has used all of its means to make people vote in preliminary votes. This would leave more time and opportunities to falsify votes. The discrepancy between the number of preliminarty votes cited by opposition – 17% and the official 14% number suggests that about 3% of anti-regime votes have been erased. At this moment several thousand people strong meeting of opposition headed by Uladzimir Hancharyk is held at October Square in Minsk – right in front of Palace of Republic, where Central Elections Committee is residing.

• 2 of the websites of Belarusian Business Newspaper conducting life coverage of elections have been blocked by Lukashenka regime. Here is the auxilliary third website with current elections news.
• Continuous 24 hour coverage of Belarusian Presidential Elections is done by Charter97
• Belarusian service of Radio Freedom/Radio Free Europe is preparing life elections coverage on September 9.

Today Belarusians have chance to finally become a free nation. Today we can break free from 200 years of Russian Domination and return to Europe again. Everything depends on participation. If 70% or more of Belarusians will come out to vote then the regime will fail to manipulate all of the votes. In fear of “Yugoslavian scenario” police is stopping youth from getting on the trains going to capital in Mahilyow. Headquarters of the Belarusian Popular Front in Hrodna were searched tonight for two hours as part of criminal investigation of attempts to overthrow an existing government. Many opposition websites from Belarus – bdg.by, *.home.by, *.unibel.by, *.nsys.by, *.minsk.by, domash.by – have been blocked. Even the phone services of people reporting events to newspapers have been disconnected. Just like Lukashenka regime was switching off Russian TV re-translation on Belarus, he can switch off Belarusian Internet. More than 2000 of independent observers of Viasna96 and Leu Sapeha Fund opposition associations have been banned by Central Electory Committee yesterday, leaving many from the elections stations without independent observers. President of the United States of America Mr. George Bush has declared yesterday his support to Belarusian nation in it’s struggle for freedom and self-determination.

September 7, 2001
The political struggle increases. Tensions are rising high. Siamion Domash had a heart attack and was hospitalized. The newly appointed chairman of state television and radio network died off heart attack on September 6, 2001. Elections have already started in remote areas. Multiple cases of violations are being reported – the boxes of bulletins are broken in, disappearing, independent observers are harrassed and even beaten up. Militia was given an order to arrest independent pollsters at the exit of election points. Lukashenka has already announced that he does not care whether the West will recognize elections as legitimate. The opposition newspapers – Pahonia, Naroodnaia Volia – were raided by special security forces. All special election newspaper releases were confiscated. Even non-political newspapers like “Information Exchange”were searched for anti-Lukashenka materials. The opposition candidate Uladzimir Hancharyk called on democratic forces oof the Belarusian nation to gather at October Square of Minsk at 8.05PM – 5 min after elections official ending to wait together for the announcement of election results.

August 14, 2001
4 Presidential candidates have been officially registered for participation in Belarusian Presidential Elections on September 9, 2001 – Siamion Domash, Uladzimir Hancharyk, Siarhiej Hajdukevich and current ruler – Aliaksandar Lukashenka. Each of them has collected more than required 100, 000 signatures of supporters foor the registration. According to official announcement of democratic “Five” Domash is planning to take off his candidature in suppoort of Hancharyk. Hancharyk is promising Domash prime-minister post in his government.

Hancharyk and Domash after the official registration as Presidential Candidates.In my opinion, the democratic forces of Belarus have already lost these elections to Lukashenka. There was a slim chance that Domash would become a single candidate of unified oppoosition. Domash had a chance to lift the spirits of the majority of Belarusian society, unite Belarusians in desire to build normal civilized society and a prosperous country. But he was too politically biased towards strong and independent Belarus to win the vote of the other members of “Democratic Five”: a communist, a general, a labor unionist and a former Lukashenka prime minister. And Domash (as most of Belarusians) wasn’t aggressive enough to take charge and break through oother opposition. As a results 5 weak leaders have come into stalemate until they have come up with a blek compromise winner. The winner was Hancharyk – someone who holds no strong opinions and suggests no program. He has no enemies and no friends. He might be a winner amongst “democratic Five” but, again in my opinion, he will blow the elections, despite of all international support summoned at this moment to Belarus. All in all,. it is inability of Belarusian Democratic forces to overcome personal ambitions, unify and come up with a strong single candidate that is going to bring on Belarus another 7 years of Lukashenka tireless efforts to turn our entire country into one crazy giant “kolhoz”.

July 21, 2001
Democratic “Five” presidential candidates in alphabetical order: Uladzimir Hancharyk, Siamion Domash, Siarhej Kaliakin, Paval Kazlouski and Mikhail Chigir. This five candidates are coordinating their pre-elections activities. Alliances are possible and likely between democratic “Five” in a final stretch of elections.

Democratic “Five” after a 5-hour meeting to single out a leader. Left to right: Mikhail Chygir, Siamion Domash, Uladzimir Hancharyk, Siarhej Kaliakin, Paval Kazlouski

Each of the democratic “Five” candidates has collected 100,000 signatures and is qualified for Presidential Election run. But on July 21 they have announced that the only Single Candidate, who would run will be Uladzimir Hancharyk. The rest are pulling out of the race and are going to back him up. Hancharyk has promised seats in his future government to all 4 remaining members of democratic “Five”.

July 21, 2001.
Uladzimir Hancharyk came out the winner of the closed door meeting of democratic “Five” yesterday. The five democratic candidates in their infinite wisdom agreed that Hancharyk should be a single candidate from unified opposition. Well now we are supposed to see what Belarusians think of this Single Candidate on elections day.

Siamion Domash Siamion Domash is a presidential candidate of the Unified Belarusian opposition. Unfortunately this unity has partially felt apart. Currently he is one of the oppositional “Five” group – five possible candidates for September elections with relatively similar programs. According to the leader of Unified Citizens’ Party – Anatol’ Liabedz’ka – Siamion Domash is currently receiving majority of support among “Democratic Five” from Coordinational Council of Democratic Forces (KRDS). Mr. Domash was a Head of Hrodna City Executive Committee in 1990-1993. He has later headed an entire Hrodna Province in 1994-1996 until his clashes with President Lukashenka begun. He is a strong supporter of delegating the government to local authorities and decentralizing power.

Uladzimir Hancharyk
Uladzimir Hancharyk is the Chairman of the Federation of Labor Unions of Belarus. According to press secretary of Mr. Hancharyk Belarusian Labor Unions promise powerful support to this candidate during the campaign.

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Siarhej Kaliakin
As one of the main threats the support group of Mr. Kaliakin sees the procedural formalities invented by current Lukashenka regime for creation of election initiative groups. The secretary of Central Committe of Party of Kommunists of Belarus, Mrs. Alena Skryhan, says that they apparently the procedure requires each member of such initiative group to file an official application in the presence of two witnesses stating the volunteer nature of joining the group. This will create various registration problems in Central Election Committe according to Mr. Kaliakin support group.

Paval Kazlouski
Mr. Kazlouski is a former Minister of Defence of Belarus. He is now the President of the Rehabilitation Fund for the Families of Former Military Servicemen. Mr. Kazlouski is currently actively traveling around Belarus creating local initiative groups for collection of signatures.There are steady rumors that he had abused his Minister of Defence government position holding a big wedding celebration for his son at the military base.

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Mikhail Chygir
Former Prime Minister of Lukashenka government has got lately in trouble with President and barely escaped a prison term. Currently is running against Lukashenka in presidential elections 2001. Mikhail Chygir and Siamen Domash are considered two strongest candidates apart from Lukashenka.Mr. Chygir was laid off as prime-minister and put to jail together with his wife for financial machinations. Rumors say tha he had built a Palaccio with artististic fresco paintings for himself with not entirely clean funds. He is out of jail running for president now. But his wife is still in jail.

Siarhiej Hajdukevich
Siarhej Hajdukevich is a leader of Liberal-Democratic Party and block “New Belarus – Unity”. Currently he had diminished his initiative group of 5000 people to 2.13 for “an easier management”. Hajdukevich is hoping to use his business ties with Russian business structures to score the support of Kremlin in the upcoming Belarusian presidential elections. Refers to members of “Oppositional Five” as “beggars” implying that he is rich and understands business better than them. He hopes to beat Uladzimir Hancharyk in the elections because as he says “Hancharyk is enemy of Russia now”.So far (July 22) Mr. Hajdukevich has collected the necessary 100,000 signatures and is entering the race as candidate.

Mikhail Marynich
- is a former Ambassador of Belarus in Latvia. Marynich was a chief economy advisor of Lukashenka in 1994-1996 when Belarus turned it’s economy back towards Russia.

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Zianon Pazniak
Mr. Pazniak is one of the founders of the Belarusian Popular Front “Adradzhennie” (“Renaissance”) is currently residing in USA. He is often named as a favorable presidential candidate by Belarusian Nationalistic Right. One possible obstacle for this candidate is the official requirement of 5 year residence in Belarus for a presidential candidate.

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Viktar Ciareshchanka
The first initiative group registrated by Belarusian Central Electoral Committee on June 12, 2001 became the group of Viktar Ciareshchanka according to “Svaboda” newspaper in Minsk, Belarus. Currently his initiative group has 6,000 members.

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Natallya Masherava
daughter of Piotr Masherau who has headed Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic for many years in the 70-ies and 80-ies and was deeply respected by Belarusians. Natallia Masherava is currently a deputee of Belarusian Parliament. She clearly expresses her sentiment for restoration of the USSR and is supporting the dissolution of independent Belarus in Russian-Belarusian Union. She actually is the Vice-Director of the Main Control of Informational and Analytical Work and Public Relations of the Parlamentary Congress of ill-famous Russia-Belarus Union. Mrs. Masherava has recently been mentioned in press as two of the pro-Russian candidates which are likely to receive Kremlin’s support.Natallya Masherava is so close in her views to nostalgic pro-USSR position of Lukashenka that she could have effectively drawn voices from his electorate. Either Lukashenka realized this threat and pressed her into quitting race, or Natallya Masherava herself sacrificed her chances for Lukashenka. But she took her candidature off the list blaming it on unhealthy atmosphere around elections.

Leanid Sinitsyn
Has been mentioned recently as a second candidate that will receive Kremlin endorsement and support.

Siarhej Antonchyk
- is the leader of non-government organiozation “Labor Self-Help”. He says that unlike other candidates he is not having any Soviet nomenclature past. Mr. Antonchyk states that only fresh candidates without “apparatchik” past has a chance of conducting effective social and economical reforms in Belarus.

Auhien Kryzhanouski

Valery Levaneuski
- is a Belarusian entrepreneur/businessman.Uladzimir Mackevich
- is former head of Belarusian KGB, currently exiled to Bulgaria as Belarusian Ambassador. He was replaced in November 2000 by Mr. Sheiman, after the scandal broke out about political kidnappins and murders in Belarus, that involved President Security Special Forces.

Aliaksandar Iarashuk
- is Chairman of the State Committee of Belarusian Labor Union of Agricultural Industrial Complex.

Mikalaj Miakeka
- Vice President of the International Association “Human Rights Defence”

Aliaksej Liashko
- construction engineer, director of Association “Lipen’” in Homel’

Kanstancin Kananovich
- electrical engineer, lqwyer, unemployed.

Valiancin Semak
- retired KGB officer

Nina Labanava
- head of the livrary division of Bekarusian State Economic University

Uladzimir Lapcevich
- retired person.

Leanid Kalugin
- General Director of Minsk Refrigirator plant “Atlant”

Yury Dan’kou
- businessman, entrepreneur

Siarhiej Skrabec
- director of trading house “BelBabaeuskae”

• “How the candidates in candidates are preparing for elections” – an article by Alesia Sidliarevich in “Pahonia” newspaper published in Hrodna, Belarus.
• “Svaboda” newspaper
• Washington Post: “President Claims Elections Victory in Belarus: Protesters Say Elections Was Rigged”
• New York Times: “Stalinist’s Disputed Victory in Belarus Vote Is Denounced”
• Swedish school project “Alexander runs for Europe”
• UK’s Guardian: “Freedom in a cage”, “Belarussian foils dictator-buster… for now”
• UK’s Financial Times: “Belarusian opposition denies misusing Western aid”
• UK’s Independent: “Belarus re-elects president amid vote-rigging row”

Disappeared in Belarus – Dzmitry Zavadsky and Anatol’ Krasouski (top),
Viktar Hanchar and Yury Zakharanka (bottom).

This is a case of a growing scandal with several prominent political figures disappeared in Belarus. Among them Dmitry Zavadski, Anatol’ Krasouski, Viktar Hanchar, Yury Zakharanka, Karpenka, Majsenia. Several witnesses, who defected Belarus, are blaming special death squad “Almaz” of Belarusian regime and the highest governmental figures as the ones, who were involved or directly ordered political assassinations.

• Memorandum Dissapearances in Belarus, January 2004 by Christos Pourgourides
  Christos Pourgourides, a Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) reporter on high-profile disappearances in Belarus is indignant by the absence of reaction of the Belarusian authorities to the memorandum on the cases of the missing people. He says that this fact only confirms that his memorandum on high-profile disappearances is well-founded. If by the end of January winter session of the PARE assembles, its juridical committee would discuss the final report by Christos Pourgourides. There is strong evidence that the Belarusian authorities are involved to abductions of people and concealment of these cases.
• Amnesty International address to President of Belarus 1/14/04

It gives a very strange impression that until now your government refused to give any cooperation to any investigation into the fate of the men who disappeared. We again urge you to change your attitude and answer the questions we mean, in behalf of the relatives of these men and because justice is so very important, not only for the world outside Belarus.

• Human rights activists arrested in Minsk On Human Rights Day 12/10/2003
  The action We remember in defense of human rights and memory of the missing people in Belarus was held in Minsk on December 10, on the 55th anniversary of the Universal Human Rights Declaration. Natallia Kaliada, a journalist, a member of Human Rights Department of the Civil Initiative Charter 97, just standing with Dzmitry Zavadsky’s portrait, was detained… and brought the human rights activist to the Central Department of Internal Affairs.
• We Remember Action Participant to Be Under Trial In Barysaw 09/01/2004
  The trial on the participant of the action We remember, Zubr activist Alyaksandar Monich is to take place on January 9 in Barysau

• Website of Sviatlana Zavadskaya – the wife of disappeared in Belarus operator of Russian TV station Dmitry Zavadski, who was working at the time on material about Lukashenka regime.

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  Wives of disappeared in Belarus – Sviatlana Zavadskaya (left) and Iryna Krasouskaia

The first Belarusian Language Grammar was composed and printed in Vilna (Vilnius), back then the capital of Grand Duchy of Lithuania – in 1596 by Lauryn Zyzani. The second version of Belarusian Grammar – “Grammatiki Slovenskiia” (“Slavic Grammar”) – was published in Vilna by Meleci Smatrycki in 1618. Grammar by Smatrycki underwent multiple reprints in the coming years. Such the fifth and sixth reprints were done in Moscow in 1648 and 1721. It was re-edited by Paula Nenadovich in Rymniki in 1755 and became the basis of Serbian literary language. Hristan Dupchanin has reworked it for Bulgarian language. This Grammar also became the basis of the first Ukrainian grammar of Ivan Mogil’nicki.

The law on languages, adopted in 1990 after the Belarusian language had suffered a long period of decline between the 1930s and 1980s, should be seen as a legislative means aimed at defending a weaker language. At the same time, the law stipulated a much broader use of the Belarusian language, which was supposed to change from a minority to majority language in the future.

Language legislation and related practical measures that were not secret but brought before the public were a novelty for state institutions of post-Soviet Belarus No special bodies existed that could design and pursue a language policy, therefore, in the initial stage of implementation, the executive branch had to rely on the intellectual resources of a non-governmental organization, which had experience in this field, the Belarusian Language Society (BLS) founded in June 1989.

Thus, in May 1990, BLS together with the Ministry of Education of the BSSR held a scientific and practical Conference entitled “The Official Status of the Belarusian Language: Problems and Ways to Implement the Law “In September 1990, the Council of Ministers adopted “The State Programme for the Development of the Belarusian Language and Other National Languages in the BSSR” that stipulated a number of measures for implementing the law over the course of the 1990s. Both in the BSSR and the USSR, the discussion regarding language problems in Belarus was under the control of the party. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the declaration of independence of the Republic of Belarus and the suspension of the CPSU and CPB, possibilities of free speech increased greatly, The USSR – the regional superpower – was now gone from the World map. An independent Belarusian state emerged and protests arose among the Russian-oriented population, which to a large extent comprised the Belarusian elite. Just yesterday they identified themselves exclusively with the USSR and had no need for contact with the Belarusian language or culture. Finding themselves in this completely new situation, these people argued that the existing legislation is poorly grounded and attempted to discredit both the new linguistic trends and the social and political groups behind them. With Belarus adopting a multiparty system, language issues became an essential element of political discourse. Democraticaly oriented figures fiercely competed for the right to speak on behalf of “the true” democrats and the political environment in Belarus saw many ephemeral pro-democratic associations seeking their own niches.

For example, following the establishment of the United Democratic Party of Belarus (UDPB) in November 1990 (the first party in Belarus), one year later the Movement for Democratic Reform (MDF) was founded, the program of which differed from that of UDPB only in respect to cultural issues. Inevitably, MDF used the new cultural policy as the arena for demonstrating its political views. The movement loudly criticized the 1990 language legislation for being undemocratic and accused BPF, the major democratic force in Belarus at the time, of Bolshevism, russophobia, isolationism and of “arousing nationalist instincts.” In March 1992. MDF spoke in favor of granting the official Status to both Belarusian and Russian “due to the linguistic situation that has developed and to give the citizens free choice in regard to the language of education” (Narodnaya Gazeta, 7 March 1992). With reference to the existing linguistic situation, MDF suggested that the perspective language policy be replaced with a retrospective one corresponding to the previous state of affairs. Proclaiming the antidemocratic and anti-liberal character of the 1990 law on languages and claiming that it “violates an individual ‘s right of self-determination” (Femida , no. 21, 24-30 May 1993), MDF members and the Publishing house “Endan” compiled and published a draft law “On Languages in the Republic of Belarus” that provided both Belarusian and Russian with official status.

This activity of the “liberalist” parties forced the United Democratic Party of Belarus to clarify its attitude towards language legislation. In November 1994, UDBP’s central council ordered its political commission to prepare a statement regarding the right to freely choose the language of education and the need to enforce it. The program of the United Civic Party (UCP, a 1995 merger between UDPB and the Civic Party) stated that the citizens must have “the right to choose which language their children are raised and taught in.“ Granting parents the unconditional right to choose the language in which their children are taught, would probably have resulted in the parents choosing the language that in their eyes had real social advantages, Therefore, in this case the weaker and less prestigious Belarusian language would have become a victim of the emerging democracy in Belarus, should such an approach have been adopted.

The left was also active in the first half of the 1990s. Although in the late 1980s the Communist Party of Belarus (CPB) was forced to support (through the BSSR Supreme Soviet) the law that made Belarusian the only official language, in the 1990s, following some internal changes, it reverted to its original position. In the early 1990s newspapers supporting left-wing parties launched a campaign of discrediting existing language legislation and its practices. Two-language state model was a non-compromise demand in the programs of the Movement for Democracy, Social Progress and Justice (MDSPJ), founded in November 1991, and the Popular Movement of Belarus founded in December1992. In September 1993, left-wing movements held a congress of the people of Belarus that adopted a resolution demanding to “remove violence and discrimination from language policy, adopt official bilingualism (Belarusian and Russian), legitimize the right of parents to choose the language of education for their children.“
The media started a heated debate on whether the adopted language policy was justified and correctly implemented. The discussion showed that for Belarusian to be more widely used, more purposeful and focused efforts should be made in comparison with those employed by state authorities at the time. For example, the introduction of Belarusian in higher education and science encountered specific difficulties due to a shortage of teaching aids and scientific literature in Belarusian. The discussion also revealed that there were people in Belarus who categorically did not accept the existence of an independent Belarusian language nor approved of any practical steps taken towards its development. It was primarily those people who saw the Belarusian language as inferior that became the foundation for establishing the pro-Russian party “The Slavic Union — White Rus’“ in August 1992. In its program, which the party adopted in December 1993, the Belarusian language was classified as merely a “regional“ language and a dialect of the Russian language. The Belarusian parliament regularly discussed Belarusian and other languages in the first half of the 1990s. It is worth noting that the 12^th Supreme Soviet (that convened in May 1990 and which was dominated by Communists with 86% of the seats) was not particularly interested in becoming actively involved in the use of Belarusian on a broader basis. Nevertheless, due to the declaration of Belarus sovereignty gradual de-monopolisation of the party’s power and the Suspension of communist parties in the USSR and BSSR (CPSU and CPB, respectively), communist MPs were forced to succumb to the efforts of the few national democrats. Consequently, laws on culture and education were passed in June and October 1991 that either directly referred to the law of languages (in the former case) or even slightly supported it (in the latter).
However, as the situation in countries neighboring Belarus changed (former communists won elections in Lithuania, growing resistance to Yeltsin’s reform appeared in Russia). BPF lost its influence in the parliament, CPB was resurrected in the summer of 1992 and the Supreme Soviet lifted its ban on the party in February 1993, the situation inside the country also began to change. In the first half of 1992, the former nomenclature set up the “Belarus“ faction in the Supreme Soviet and began to oppose both democratic and independence-oriented initiatives, primarily on the grounds of the weak position of the national democrats in language issues. For instance, when Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislaw Shushkevich refused to sign a Belarusian-Russian collective security treaty in May 1992, the “Belarus“ faction immediately “blackmailed“ him by holding a referendum about the official Status of the Russian language. The proposal to make Russian the other official language in Belarus, first voiced by deputies of veterans’ organizations, became an increasingly more frequent issue in the Supreme Soviet. Language issues were also debated in parliament in 1993 while preparing a new constitution. The parliamentary working group attempted to preserve the previous Version of the article on language; however, neither that version, nor any amended one, was passed in May 1993. During the parliament’s fall session, the version stipulating Belarusian as the only official language received even less support than in the spring. As all hope for passing the language attitude was virtually lost, the parliamentary constitutional commission attempted to leave it out altogether. However, this was strongly opposed by the commission for culture and historical heritage.
The practical implementation of the law on language encountered great difficulties, as the new language policy was being pursued simultaneously with economic reform that lowered living standards and was not always welcomed by the people. Some people, including the ideologically orthodox workers, associated (probably unconsciously) the ideologically “adverse“ reconstruction of economic life with the new language policy aimed at creating advantages for the Belarusian language. This inspired their exceptionally aggressive attitude to the new trends in the linguistic situation in Belarus. At the time the educational system was the most receptive to implementing the law on languages, and during 1990-1994 the situation in secondary schools radically changed to the benefit of the Belarusian language. Teachers of Belarusian enjoyed a 10% salary bonus. Higher educational establishments also began to experiment with teaching in Belarusian, and some pedagogical institutions taught solely in Belarusian. Meanwhile, loud protests from the people to revise the language law, the vague and unstable political situation during the first years of independence, the lack of will from the government to implement linguistic reform (and as a result mistrust of the people in regard to the state’s intentions in this respect) as well as the general atmosphere of transition characteristic for early 1990s, resulted in the development of a strong state and legal nihilism and hampered the implementation of the 1990 law on language. With no faith in the newly-acquired independence and having no idea which way the political wind will blow, many state functionaries found it better not to take any noticeable steps to implement the law on languages, as this would allow them to stay in the mainstream should for some reason state independence be lost and the Soviet political system restored. Top-level officials remained indifferent in regard to the need to implement the language law; most of them used only Russian in public speeches anyway.

Another factor that made it complicated to implement the language law in Belarus was the fact that the 1990 law did not really set legal principles but presented “a manifesto of national and linguistic self-identification,“ as Ms. N. Myachkowskaya stated. In particular, the law did not provide any guidelines should it be violated. Due to its concern regarding the poor implementation of the law, the Minsk City Council petitioned the Supreme Soviet at the beginning of 1993 requesting the right to administrative punishment for not observing the language law; the permission to do so was not granted. Despite the fact that the law contained a special article that obliged officials to “speak both Belarusian and Russian languages,“ it did not contain any specific principles to enforce this article in practice. In fact, state functionaries were never assessed in regard to their command of the Belarusian language. After the law had been adopted in 1990, no institutions were established in Belarus to deal specifically with language issues.

In March 1993, the 3^rd Congress of the Belarusian Language Society suggested that the Supreme Soviet set up a commission to pursue an integral language policy in the Republic of Belarus. This suggestion was, however, ignored. Nevertheless, the new constitution adopted in March 1994 contained an article that affirmed the official status of the Belarusian language; however, the same article maintained the right of the free use of the Russian language as a language of international communication. The text was copied almost in full from the 1990 law, however, in the 1990 law, Russian did not have the status of a communication medium between different ethnic groups inside Belarus. The affirmation of Russian as the language of international communication unintentionally devalued Belarusian as the only official language. Under those circumstances, it seemed natural to ask whether Belarusian could truly become the only official language in a situation where it was not considered as a means of communication between different ethnic groups.

Whereas the use of the Russian language as a means of inter-ethnic communications undermined Belarusian rather in a symbolic manner, a more serious problem appeared in Article 50 of the Constitution that guaranteed “the freedom to choose the language of raising and educating children.“ This attitude was also a response to the continuing debate on this issue. Later, alluded to this article parents categorically claimed their unconditional right to choose the language of instruction for their children.

In January 1995, the constitutional court generally supported such requests from parents. In its statement directed to the president and Supreme Soviet, the court criticized Article 24 of the law on languages that allegedly obliged secondary schools to use “exclusively the Belarusian language.“ However, the constitutional court praised other articles of the constitution that guaranteed “the freedom to choose the language of raising and educating children“ (Zvyazda, February 2, 1995).

In July 1994, supporters of official bilingualism gained strong support from the first President of Belarus, Alyaksandar Lukashenka. Even while an MP, Lukashenka suggested granting the Russian language “a status equal to the official status.“ His program prepared for the presidential elections contained a paragraph on “providing a real opportunity for every citizen of the Republic of Belarus to think and speak the language he was raised in.“ After his election as president, Lukashenka addressed language issues for the first time when speaking at the Belarusian Pedagogical University on 1 September 1994. The President defended teachers of the social sciences and the Russian language who, as he said, had nearly become pariahs in some higher educational establishments. Alyaksandar Lukashenka expressed his criticism of the educational policy (aimed at increasing the use of Belarusian) pursued during the previous years and said that the language of teaching should not be determined in an administrative way.

Lukashenka’s speech at the Pedagogical University was a signal to begin a campaign of support for the Russian language. Just five days following the president’s speech, an “Appeal of an Initiative Group“ was distributed in the Vitsebsk Pedagogical Institute, whose authors, including teachers, demanded that students and teachers themselves choose the language of instruction, “supporting the intentions of the President of the Republic to begin healing the social situation.“ In September and October 1994 parents in some schools went on strike against the “forced“ teaching in Belarusian and, strangely enough, these events were covered by some of the most popular state-owned newspapers.

An interesting episode in the struggle for granting the Russian language official status occurred in the fall of 1994 when a group of members from the pro-Communist Popular Movement attempted to initiate a referendum on various issues, including the language issue, The request submitted by this group was considered by six parliamentary commissions and the Ministry of Justice. All of the seven institutions turned the request down for “more or less the same reasons.“ as the newspapers wrote. In their refusals, the institutions referred to Article 3 of the law on referenda that forbade holding referenda on issues “violating the inalienable right of the people of the Republic of Belarus to the state-guaranteed existence of Belarusian national culture and language.“

In October 1994, the central commission for elections and referenda explained to the applicants that the question as to whether the Russian language should be given official status “is directly forbidden by the Republic’s legislation.“

In the fall of 1994 a committee “For the Free Choice of Language in Education“ was founded in Minsk, under the aegis of the Slavic Union. On 29 November, the committee led a demonstration of approximately 20 parents, demanding education in Russian, to the building of the Minsk City Council. Footage of this rally, spiced with comments, was shown on state television.

Meanwhile, the manner in which the law on languages was being implemented and the on-going campaign for revising language legislation caused numerous protests from various organizations and parties, such as BLS and BPF, A non-governmental committee for the defense of the Belarusian language was founded at the end of 1994. Moreover, an alternative campaign was underway for Belarusian State University to completely transition to the exclusive use of Belarusian by 1 September 1995. In January 1995, activists of the committee picketed the buildings of the university, Ministry of Education, Constitutional Court and UN post. Later that month, the committee adopted a statement that called on the citizens to inform the Prosecutor’s Office about all attempts at violating the official status of the Belarusian language by government employees. On 16 February 1995, the committee published its complaint to the Prosecutor General regarding President Lukashenka.

The President, however, intended to hold a referendum about the official status of the Russian language. He first shared this idea with representatives of veterans’ organizations on February 2, and soon confirmed his intention on February 20. On March 18 , newspapers published a letter addressed to President Lukashenka, signed by 60 MPs (mainly delegates of veterans’ organizations) in which they asked him to initiate a referendum concerning language issues. Three days later Lukashenka spoke in detail about the approaching referendum to the Supreme Soviet, although he did not present the precise questions. At the time, many seemed to believe that a referendum was rather unlikely, in view of the 1994 refusal. This was the opinion of Valery Tsikhinya, chairman of the Constitutional court, expressed during a press Conference on March 22. He justified his point of view with Article 3 of the law on referenda. On March 31, the general assembly of the Humanities Department of the Academy of Science adopted an appeal not to include a language related question in the referendum.

Nevertheless, Lukashenka filed his proposal of initiating a referendum comprising four questions to the Supreme Soviet. However, the proposal was turned down on March 11, after the parliamentary commissions had debated the proposal and objected to three questions, including the one on languages. The President responded by threatening the Supreme Soviet with holding the referendum without its consent, which resulted in more than twenty MPs beginning a hunger strike in the parliamentary session hall. However, on the night of March 12 they were thrown out of the Supreme Soviet building by military detachment acting on orders of president Lukashenka. This extraordinary event resulted in the demoralized deputies violating procedure and adopting a resolution to hold the referendum on March 13. On March 26, the parliamentary commission for culture and historical heritage filed a request to the constitutional court to consider the legitimacy of the Supreme Soviet’s resolution but the court refused to hear this case.

The referendum was held on May 14, 1995. The first of the four questions was as follows: “Do you agree with granting the Russian language equal status with Belarusian?“ According to official data, voter frequency was 64.8%. Of those voting, 88.3% (53.9% of all eligible voters) voted “yes“ with respect to this question. Numerous violations committed during the preparation and holding the referendum soon came to light

First, Article 3 of the law on referenda was violated (the law mentioned above that forbids holding of referenda on such issues).

Second, Article 148 of the Constitution did not permit any changes or amendments to the constitution during the final six months of the parliament’s term of Office.Third, members of the referendum commission were appointed in violation of Articles 18 and 20 of the Law on Referenda.

Essentially, limitations were imposed on the campaign against the proposals of the referendum. As a result, the referendum had to be carried out under the strict control of the executive power. The state-owned media, especially the electronic media, mainly presented the views of the referendum’s initiator. Before the referendum, the Belarusian Language Society twice asked the management of the State TV and Radio Company to allow Society representatives to go on the air. One of the deputy chairpersons of the Society recorded an interview for Programme 2 of Belarusian Radio. The interview was never aired and no explanation was given. Meanwhile, the State TV kept showing activists from the Slavic Union and the committee “For the Free Choice of Language in Education.“

The 1995 referendum coincided with the parliamentary election campaign. The OSCE delegation that observed the referendum and the elections concluded that neither complied with international standards of free and fair voting. In particular, the delegation noted the government’s control over the media (which resulted in the media broadcasting “edited“ or false information), interference of the executive branch in the electoral process, discrimination against political parties, etc. The US State Department issued a special statement expressing its regret about the way and the atmosphere in which the leaders of Belarus conducted the 1995 referendum and elections.

Belarusian society, suffering economic hardships at the time of the referendum, failed to see (and to a large extent did not want to see) the threat posed to the Belarusian language hidden behind the “innocent“ formulation of the question regarding the “equality“ of the two languages. It turned out that Lukashenka’s initiative suited the wishes of a large part of society, which wanted a return to the good old communist times with cheap sausage in shops and no language problems whatsoever With the help of this referendum, the President of Belarus wanted (as he mentioned to members of Homel city council) to gain public support for his personal conviction that “the Belarusian language is simple and that it is impossible to say anything profound using it.“

The results of the 1995 referendum shocked those supporting the broader use of the Belarusian language It was only six weeks later that the secretariat of BLS adopted an appeal to the citizens of Belarus, questioning the results of the referendum as the expression of the nation’s will. The authors of the appeal referred to the uncounted votes of “the people from the new generation — our children and adolescents, who have tasted their native language in kindergartens and schools,“ to the will of “many generations of our ancestors“ and “millions of victims of Stalinism and fascism.“ Moreover, the appeal admitted that “we have now been squelched.“

Reacting to the results of the referendum, and hoping to get the situation at least slightly under control, the Supreme Soviet’s commission for education, culture and preservation of historical heritage adopted two resolutions in June 1995. The first recommended ministries and other state institutions to implement various provisions in order to encourage state officials, leaders of organisations and enter prise executives to gain command of both the Belarusian and Russian language. The resolution stressed the need to learn the language, which the officials did not know, to a degree sufficient for them to conduct official duties. The other resolution recommended the Ministry of Education and Science to introduce an obligatory entrance examination involving both Belarusian and Russian in all higher and secondary special educational establishments. The latter recommendation actually only added Russian to the entrance exams lists as Belarusian had already been on these lists. Due to the fact that the term of Office of the 12th Supreme Soviet was coming to an end, and the referendum worked against a wider use of Belarusian, the two resolutions had no legal or practical importance whatsoever. Aimed at lowering the status of the Belarusian language, the 1995 referendum was certainly not held to make state officials study and use Belarusian. On the other hand, the recommendation to make all university entrants pass two extra linguistic exams, no matter what they chose to study, sounded like a good idea but had no chance of support.

The statement issued by the 5^th International Congress of the Belarusian Pen Centre regarding the May 1995 referendum (held in August), stated: “In practice, the introduction of Russian as the second official language will affirm today’s real disparity of the Belarusian language and will assist in eliminating it, which means a continuation of the policy of Russification and denationalization of the Belarusian people previously pursued by the Russian empire and then the USSR.“ The congress adopted the resolution “On Freedom and Responsibility of the Media“ that read in part “in Belarus, freedom of speech and press applies only to some citizens, mainly those close to power structures, whereas responsibility for the spoken, published or circulated word is imposed onto others, who mainly belong to the Opposition minority‚ or the‚Belarusian-speaking part of the population.“ Congress documents mentioned that the referendum, the regime’s occupation and subordination of the media to state power had paved the way for introducing “reservations for Belarusian-speaking Belarusians.“ The referendum itself was referred to as a manifestation of “muscle democracy“ or “democracy substituted by pseudo-democracy“ (Nasha Slova, November 1, 1995).

Previously advocates of the broader use of Belarusian referred to “the people’s will,“ allegedly witnessed by the population census, whereas after the referendum they were shown the will of “another people,“ or rather, “another will,“ according to which the situation of the Belarusian language would be acceptable only formally, on paper. Therefore, the issue of the Belarusian language having a “real existence“ was no longer an urgent matter. The importance of this lesson for the Belarusian intelligentsia, which is traditionally very strongly influenced by popular convictions, should not be underestimated.

Supreme Soviet elected in May and December 1995 was not particularly interested in language issues. On the one hand there were very few MPs who, in the unfavorable situation of 1995-96, would raise the issue of developing the Belarusian language and resolve it in a positive way, as no BPF representatives were elected to this parliament. On the other hand, after the idea of Belarusification had been crushed by the referendum, this defeat could be used in practice by eliminating some of the acts that promoted the use of the Belarusian language. This was not difficult to do.

The results of the referendum were published on May 26. On May 30 and 31, even before the results were approved by the parliament, the Ministry of Education ordered the Russian language and literature to be added to the list of entrance exams of higher and special secondary educational establishments. The ministry explained that the entrants did not have to pass exams on both languages but could choose one of them.

In June 1995, the Ministry of Education published its guidelines in regard to enrolling children in the first grade and kindergartens. This was now to be done according to the wishes of their parents. The administrative offices of schools and kindergartens were instructed to hold parental meetings, during which parents were to submit applications in which they specified the desired language of their children’s education. It was correctly foreseen in the ministry’s document that such unlimited choice could result in schools becoming bi-lingual, but this was assessed as “a transitional period.“ The principle of choosing the language was not limited to kindergartens and first grades, it also applied to the second, third and fourth grades.

The new language-in-education policy soon yielded results. Aware of the new trend, a large majority of parents in the city began to choose Russian as the language of instruction for their children. In 1995, 62% of first grade pupils studied in Russian, compared to 25% during the previous year. As a consequence, the percentage of those studying in Belarusian fell from 75% to 38%. The following year (in 1996), this trend continued and the relation was 68% Russian and 32% Belarusian. The number of pupils in the 2nd-4th grades, and sometimes even older, taught in Belarusian was also decreasing, but not as rapidly as in the case of the lower grades. Parents of children who attended Belarusian-language classes in the 2nd and higher grades sensed the change and began to demand those classes be changed to Russian, often ignoring the linguistic habits their children had developed and the terminology they used. Those demands were met.

The 1995 changes in the language structure of schools were accompanied by conflicts among the parents of schoolchildren as well as between parents and school authorities In the new situation, advocates of Belarusian-language schools in the city often found it difficult to collect enough applications to open a Belarusian-language class even in the larger schools. As a result, they either had to abandon education in Belarusian or look for a Belarusian-language school outside their neighborhood. As for the 2nd and higher grades previously taught in Belarusian, parents frequently found themselves in conflict over the language of their children’s education, While some demanded a change into Russian, others resolutely stood for maintaining the status quo. The choice of the language was in fact in the hands of the school administrations, which forced one of the sides to abandon their demands. Since the general trend of the summer and fall of 1995 implied education in Russian, those conflicts were resolved to the benefit of Russian. When pro-Belarusian parents became only a minority, these conflicts became latent and to a large extent were hidden from the public. In such cases, on perfectly “lawful“ grounds and in accordance with the routes of democracy, it was suggested that the Belarusian-speaking children leave the class or school that had only recently had a Belarusian-language status. Sometimes pupils had to change schools several times as each new school they attended would adopt Russian according to the will of the parents. A parent filed suit against Hrodna administration in 1997 complaining about a school that refused to educate his daughter in the Belarusian language after she had completed the 5^th grade. He lost the case. In general, the social situation after the referendum was unfavorable for the Belarusian language and many complaints about violating linguistic rights and freedoms of Belarusian speakers were not considered, let alone resulted in legal action. Some schools themselves initiated changes into Russian and sent notices to the parents demanding that they submit applications for this change of language.

The rapid decline in the number of Belarusian-language schools and classes in the fall of 1995, accompanied by strong administrative pressure, resulted in the Executive Committee of the United Civic Party of Belarus issuing a statement in September 1995. The document protested against forcing the Russian language into school education, and pointed out that some officials interpret referendum results in a biased way. The party demanded that the rights of parents to teach their children in either Russian or Belarusian be not hampered.

Meanwhile, the 13^th Supreme Soviet had not approved the results of the referendum, On the one hand, the rapid advance of Russian and the withdrawal of Belarusian were so blatant that they needed no legal grounds. On the other hand, individual leaders of the parliament spoke about the future of linguistic regulations in a way differing from the view of President Lukashenka. For example, spokesman Syamyon Sharetski did not think that the unconditional victory of pro-Russian forces in the referendum should have been affirmed automatically without consideration. The parliament’s revision of the 1990 law on languages was delayed until June 1998, three years after the referendum, when the House of Representatives (the lower chamber of the parliament introduced by Lukashenka after the revolt in 1996) amended the 1990 law. The structure of the 1998 law was an almost exact copy of the 1990 law, however, the amended version had no preamble. (The preamble to the 1990 law presented an evaluation of the critical situation of the Belarusian language and stated the need to protect it.) The main characteristic of the revised law was that nearly half of its articles linked the Belarusian and Russian languages with the conjunction “or“ (Articles 3. 9, 12-18. 21, 25, 28-30, 32), with “and (or)“ being used almost as frequently (Articles 7, 8, 10, 11, 19, 20, 22-24. 26, 27, 31). For example, Article 14 maintains that legal proceedings in the Republic of Belarus are to be conducted in „either the Belarusian or Russian language“; and according to Article 20, the Armed Forces use „the Belarusian and (or) the Russian language.“ Despite the official status of both languages declared by Article 2, the excessive use of the conjunction „or“ in the text paves the way to using either of them without the mandatory use of the other. The 1998 law consciously pursues a „policy of no policy,“ which enhances the disparity between the two languages and forces out the weaker language, Belarusian.

In the fall of 1996 another referendum was initiated by Lukashenka that gave him the support of voters in regard to a draft constitution, which greatly increased presidential power and involved Belarusian and Russian as the two official languages. The conflict between Alyaksandar Lukashenka and democrats in Belarus became even more intense. The 1996 revolt presented an opportunity to reanimate activity aimed at a Belarusian-Russian union, the Statutes of which were adopted in 1997. Article 38 of the Statutes designated Russian the working language of the union’s institutions. Between 1996 and 1999, democratic forces in Belarus held several mass rallies against Belarus’ incorporation into Russia with Belarusian being the prevailing language of these demonstrations. In the late 1990s, the Belarusian administration was not interested in the development of the Belarusian language and the needs of Belarusian speakers. The use of the Belarusian language was continually being pushed aside. The House of Representatives (the legislative body in the Lukashenka-appointed parliament) prepared official documents only in Russian. Some local administrations have been adopting legislation that banned the use of Belarusian. At the same time Belarusian speakers among the political opposition were being repressed. Some of the participants in mass political rallies were detained for speaking Belarusian. During court proceedings some people were forbidden to speak Belarusian or were charged for the Services of interpreters.

As the conflict between President Lukashenka and the democratic forces escalated, along with the reduction in the official use of Belarusian and the “disfranchisement“ of politically active Belarusian speakers, the Belarusian language began to be associated as an instrument for resisting presidential power. People who spoke Belarusian were almost automatically perceived as the opposition (unless they were the most socially backward part of the rural population that speaks Belarusian not because they stand for it but because they do not speak any other language). Having become a way of expressing opposition, the Belarusian language began to be used increasingly more frequently by democratic parties. When addressing the 50th Session of the UN Sub-commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in the summer of 1998, Mr. A. Sannikaw, coordinator of the political Opposition movement Charter-97 mentioned the elimination of Belarusian culture, history and language, as well as practices of “conscious mockery and suppression of the language“ in Belarus. In February 1999, the Congress of Democratic Forces of Belarus adopted a special resolution entitled “The Discrimination of the Belarusian language in the Republic of Belarus”, concluding that the Belarusian people’s rights for the free development of their native language and culture are being “grossly violated“.

Currently, the Belarusian language faces many challenges. It is insufficiently supported by the Belarusian state, the unfavorable situation of which continues to deteriorate. Issues regarding the development of the Belarusian language are traditionally neglected by the communist parties. As for democratic parties, the majority of them have only recently begun to notice that the language is an important element of the Belarusian people’s identity.

This realization was unintentionally inspired by the 1995-2000 state policy, aimed at forcing Belarusian out of normal, everyday use and into the realm of a marginal ”opposition-related“ phenomenon. The repressive state policy towards the Belarusian language can be expected to be revised in the near or distant future, regardless of any major political changes occurring in Belarus.

• Francishak Skaryna Belarusian Language Society web site.
• “Saying Nyet To Russian” an article from Newsweek at Pravapis.org (Belarusian Language related site)
• “Language, nationalism, and populism in Belarus” by at Pravapis.org
• Belarusian Government Policies Regarding the Belarusian Language at “A Belarus Miscellany” site
• Belarusian Language page at WorldLanguage.com
• Belarusian Language page at NationMaster.com encyclopedia
• Our own pages on Belarusian Politics and Belarusian Literature.
• An ultimate disgrace to Belarusian nation is the website of Lukashenka Presidential Regime which has only Russian Language version – no Belarusian Language version exists!

Lukashenka’s “victory”

V.Chernomyrdin congratulated Lukasenka on his victory in the referendum

In August 1996 Lukashenka declares he intends to hold another referendum on November 7 – the day of the October Revolution 1917. Through this referendum – which is expected to cost millions of dollars – the president plans to introduce his own constitution which will give him almost unlimited powers, such as appointment of the head of the Constitutional Court and part of the parliamentary deputies (For more information please refer to Constitution of the Republic of Belarus (Draft) from President of the Republic of Belarus ) – in spite of the fact that the constitution (which was only passed in 1994) may not legally be altered during its first five years in force.

At the same time seven leading political parties from the whole of the political spectrum from BPF to the communists hold a series of round table talks during which they harshly condemn the president’s unconstitutional actions, which, under the guise of a referendum, seek to lead the country into dictatorship. The president is repeatedly invited to take part in the discussions, but refuses.

The tension heightens when on September 11 the chairman of parliament, Siamion Sharecki, in the independent newspaper “Narodnaja Volia” accuses the president of “preparing the ground for a fascist state.” He starts his article with the words “Our country is on the brink of a fascist dictatorship.”

Siamion Sharecki – Belarus parliament chairman since 1996

The struggle between president and parliament intensifies. Against the plans of Lukasenka, parliament sets November 24 as date for the referendum and parliamentary by-elections. It also decides to add three of its own questions, proposing its own version of the constitution (draft worked out by the Communist and Agrarian party group). The parliament’s version abolishes the presidency altogether.

Lukashenka, however, chooses to ignore this decision. Uladzimir Zamiatalin, deputy chief of the president’s administration, speaks of an attempted coupe d’etat. In spite of repeated appeals by the Central Electoral Committee, the ministry of finances refuses to make funds available for the by-elections and the referendum planned by parliament.

Lukashenka declares that his referendum will not be financed with taxpayers’ money, but with private donations from a special “referendum fund.” Given the fact that the country’s industry and banking sector are all nationalized, it is not hard to imagine where those funds come from. At Lukashenka’s orders, even 100 million German marks made available by the German government for the victims of World War II in Belarus and transferred on a special account at a private bank in Minsk, were transferred on an account at the state bank.

To gather support for his referendum Lukashenka holds a “Congress of the people of Belarus” in Minsk on October 19. The five thousand participants of this congress are carefully picked by the representatives of the local presidential organs. Lukashenka hopes that the support of “his” Congress will legitimise his referendum and his disregard of parliament. However, criticism of Lukashenka’s behaviour from abroad has grown over the first half of October. The US state department and several European ambassadors condemn the President’s actions. The Russian side also calls upon both sides – the President and parliament – to respect the constitution.

Belarus is thus threatened by international isolation. Lukashenka is forced to agree to postpone the referendum from November 7 to November 24, which he announces at the “Congress of the people of Belarus”. He also concedes to make certain corrections to “his” constitution. The Communist and Agrarian party groups also agree to make several changes to their draft: the position of president is maintained, but the president has to be elected by parliament.

According to a presidential decree, however, voting starts on November 9 already. Order is given to all local leaders to provide a fixed number of votes (and a certain “result”) before November 24, the official referendum date. A week prior to the referendum, the President sacked V. Hanchar, head of the Electoral Commission – which, according to the constitution, he has no right to do. Hancar had declared that the referendum was illegal due to the infringements of law that had occurred.

Parliament reacts by collecting votes for impeaching Lukashenka and succeeds in collecting the necessary number of votes. But before starting an impeachment procedure, Parliament decided to wait for the visit of Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, who came to Minsk to mediate the conflict. Moscow urged both parties fo agree on a compromise. This waiting for a solution resulted in a loss of time, so that it was too late to start an impeachment procedure before the referendum. Lukashenka successfully carried out his referendum, the result of which was entirely foreseeable, given Lukashenka’s total control of the media and even of the Electoral Commission …

Three days after the referendum, in the presence of 110 members of the old Parliament, who had sided with Lukasenka, the new constitution was solemnly adopted and consecrated by the Metropolitan of Belarus. The 110 deputies now made up the lower chamber of the new parliament. The senators (members of the upper chamber) were partly appointed by the President (8 senators), partly by the regional authorities (8 senators from each of the 7 regions, including Minsk). (The regional candidates had to be approved by both the regional parliaments and the President’s representatives in the regions.)

At the same time, the results of the by-elections carried out together with the referendum in 61 of the country’s 260 constituencies (which had no members of parliament yet) were ignored. Most of these were large cities.

A group of about 60 members of the old parliament refused to recognize the new parliament and decided to try and continue the work of the old parliament. They founded the Citizens’ Committee for the Protection of the Constitution. The former chairman of Parliament, S. Sharecki, was elected chairman of the Citizens’ Committee. These deputies are now subject to all kinds of pressure. Some of them have lost their jobs, and the Belarusian border guard have been ordered to confiscate their passports should they try to cross the border. The former Speaker S. Sharecki and S. Shushkievich, first Belarusian head of state from 1991-1994, already lost their passports, when they tried to leave for an international conference..

Amnesty International is gravely concerned at reports that about 100 demonstrators have been detained in Belarus, and some of them allegedly ill-treated by the police following a peaceful protest on 10 March 1997 against President Lukashenko’s policies aimed at forging closer ties with the Russian Federation.

Lukashenka, Yeltsin and the Patriarch of Moscow Alexij II after the signing of the Union treaty

For Lukashenka the treaty is a major success; he hopes for remission of the Belarusian debt for oil and gas and for the creation of a common economic area with equal prices. This is another example of how Lukashenka tries to solve the problems caused by his own economic policies at Russia’s expense.

Lukashenka’s argumentation comparing the new Russo-Belarusian union with the European Union is not seen as very convincing, since neither the economic potential nor the territory concerned can be compared. This union – according to the opposition – looks more like one country surrendering its sovereignty to another one, voluntarily giving up its own independence.

The spring of 1996 is marked by a number of rallies and demonstrations in protest against the president’s policies. On March 24, April 2, 26 and May 31 tens of thousands of people take to the streets of Minsk to voice their protest against the president and defend their country’s independence. The largest rally is the one on April 26, entitled “Carnobyl’ski sliach” (“The Chernobyl path”) and held in remembrance of the Chernobyl disaster ten years ago. It is the largest meeting in Belarus since the country became independent in 1991. The main organiser of the rally was the BNF, supported by the other democratic parties, among others by the Civic Action Party.

The authorities dissolve the peaceful meeting by force. Riot police forces use truncheons and tear gas. Several hundred demonstrators are arrested and beaten by the police and members of the presidential security troops. However, not only demonstrators are arrested and beaten, but also passers-by, especially young people. Harsh measures are also taken against journalists and photographers of independent or foreign papers. Eye witnesses describe the behaviour of the police as very brutal. The official media and Belarusian state television cover the events in a very biased way: the Belarusian TV correspondent refers to the demonstrators as “drunken students, idle pensioners and other loafers” and compares them to “wild animals” who had forgotten they were human beings.

Zianon Pazniak – the leader of the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF)

Photo Christoph P�schner, LAIF

At the same time official sources more and more often mention the possibility of outlawing the BNF, especially after a speech held by BNF leader Zianon Pazniak on Ukrainian TV. Pazniak and BNF press speaker Siarhiej Naumcyk are forced to leave the country. Pazniak flees to Prague and later to Warsaw, London and eventually to the USA. Two other BNF members, Prof. Jury Chadyka and Viachyslau Siuchyk, who were arrested at the “Charnobyl’ski sliach” demonstration, go on a hunger strike in prison to protest against their arrest. Seventeen Ukrainians from the Ukrainian nationalist parties “Rukh” and “UNA-UNSO”, including one deputy, are also arrested at the same demonstration. Despite all protest they are kept in prison for several weeks, seven of them have still not been released. You can read all current speeches of Z. Pazniak in his webpage http://www.zianonpazniak.de/

The events in Minsk do not pass without attention, even sources from Moscow comment on the brutality of the measures taken by Lukashenka. During his election campaign President Yeltsin criticises Lukashenka’s methods. Lukashenka, by the way, remained the only president of a CIS country who did not openly support Yeltsin’s reelection. Rumours say that the campaign of the communist candidate Zyuganov was financed with the help of Belarusian money.

On July 1996 Zianon Pazniak and Siarhiej Naumcyk, who have been in exile since March, apply for political asylum in the USA. This is the first case of dissenters from CIS states seeking asylum in the West.

The outcome of the referendum was the following: 77.6% voted for the president to be able to dissolve parliament, if parliament violates the constitution. 82.4% voted for an economic union with Russia, 83.1% voted for Russian as second official language. The re-introduction of the old flag and national crest was supported by 75%. These figures have shown that the majority of Belarusians have given in to the president’s influence and propaganda. A few days prior to the elections Belarusian state TV had broadcast a “documentary” called “Nianavis’c” (“Hate”) which openly compared members of the opposition to the Nazis. Extracts from speeches held by leading politicians of the opposition were shown together with library pictures of Belarusian Nazi collaborators during the period of occupation by the Germans. This smear campaign against dissidents calls back to mind the times of the worst Soviet propaganda, when the people were manipulated through false information or lack of information. In this light the outcome of the 1995 elections becomes comprehensible…

SWAT team beats up Belarusian Parliament members

At this time an original Parliament has realized that the country is undergoing presidentiial coup d’etat. The vote of inconfidence was passed to president and opposition parliament locked themselves in Parliament building refusing to leave it. Lukashenka’s fate was hanging by the threat. Several big Russian politicians including Chernomyrdin arrived to Minsk. They talked some of the opposition to back down. For the rest of the opposition locked in Parliament building Lukashenka sent a SWAT special forces team (apparently of non-Belarusian origin). The special forces has beaten severely and dragged opposition Parliament members out of the Parliament. This was an official announcement of Lukashenka absolute power rein. to Minsk to diffuse the confrontation.

The new state flag based on old Soviet Byelorussian SSR flag

As far as foreign policy is concerned, Lukashenka’s main goal is to bring Belarus closer to Russia. The official media increasingly propagate slogans about a revival of the old USSR and about the “unity of the Slavic peoples”. All military bases of strategic significance have been let to the Russian army for 25 years. Belarus’s Western border, the border with Poland, is now guarded by Belarusian and Russian border guards together. More and more leading positions in the Belarusian army are given to Russians. Many important Belarusian firms are taken over by Russian companies, such as the oil-processing factories situated along the pipelines from Russia to Europe. In return for such favors, Lukashenka is granted deferment of part of the Belarusian debt in Moscow.

Criticism and political dissidents are not accepted by the president. He expects the media to “work constructively” “Unconstructive” newspapers he closes down for “twisting facts.” His opponents he condemns as enemies who try to sabotage his work. In August 1995, for example, a strike by the workers of the Minsk metro is crushed by the authorities, dozens of workers are fired. The independent trade unions are outlawed at the same time.

As the parliamentary by-elections (in those constituencies where the turnout had been lower than 50%) move closer, the president and his supporters step up their criticism of the Constitutional Court, which had declared several presidential decrees unconstitutional (such as the decree banning the metro workers union and lifting deputies’ parliamentary immunity). Lukasenka had ignored these Supreme Court decisions. He declares that the Constitutional Court is not entitled to defy the President’s decrees, since the President is elected by the people, whereas the Constitution Court judges a appointed by parliament. He even questions the Constitutional Court as an institution.

Again, the elections are neglected by the official media. Lukashenka declares that if participation turns out too low again and if the necessary number of deputies are again not elected, he intends to introduce direct presidential rule.

These comments fit in very well with the sensational interview which Lukashenka gives the German newspaper “Handelsblatt” in December 1995 and in which he expresses his view of Adolph Hitler’s policies in the 30s. He says, for example:

“…At the time Germany was raised from the ruins thanks to a firm hand. Not everything that was connected to a certain Adolph Hitler in Germany was bad. Remember his rule in Germany. The German order had grown over centuries. Under Hitler this process reached its culmination. This is perfectly in line with our understanding of a presidential republic and of the role of its president. I want to emphasize that one man cannot be all black or all white. There are positive sides as well. Germany was once built up out of the ruins with the help of a strong presidential force. Germany was raised thanks to this strong force, thanks to the fact that the whole nation united around its leader. Today we are going through a similar period, when we have to unite around one person or group of people in order to survive, hold out and get back on our feet again…”

The following day Lukasenka’s spokesman Zamiatalin tries to deny what the president has said.

Despite everything, the elections take place…

… Not a single candidate of the Belarusian Popular Front makes it into parliament. In those constituencies where they had a chance of being elected, “strange” things happen: either participation is one or two hundred votes too low for the result to be recognised as valid, or a huge number of ballots turn up with all candidates crossed out.

In January 1996 the first session of the new parliament (consisting of 199 instead of 250 deputies) take place. The leader of the Agrarian Party, Siamion Sharecki (Sharetsky), is elected speaker of parliament. The parliament is made up of the following party groups: the pro-presidential “Zhoda” (“Consensus”), the communist party, the Agrarian Party, the Civil Action Party (“Hramadzianskaje dziejannie”) of former National Bank chairman Stanislau Bahdankievic and the Social Democratic group. The remaining deputies are independent.

Who is Aliaksandr Lukashenka?

Aliaksandr Lukashenka was born on August 30, 1954 in Kopys, a small village in the Viciebsk (Vitebsk) district. He studied at the Pedagogical College in Mahiliou and at the Belarusian Agricultural Academy. From 1975 to 1977 he was a political instructor for the KGB border troops in Brest. After that he worked as leading official in various collective farms, since 1987 as director of the “Horodiec” farm in the Mahiliow district.Lukashenka likes to boast that he was the only member of parliament who in December 1991 voted against the creation of the CIS and dissolution of the Soviet Union. In reality, however, he did not take part in that vote.Shortly before he became president, speaking to the Russian Duma in Moscow, he called on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to reunite and form a new Slavic union. For anyone who knows the way Lukashenka has been fighting and oppressing the national culture and the history of Belarusians, ignoring the Belarusian language and defending a position which is rather a Russian imperialist one, persecuting human rights advocates and journalists, is not difficult to believe that – should the opportunity arise to revive a sort of USSR (or Russian Empire, …) – this man would try to become the leader of such a state.While he kissed a lot of political figures during his career (shown here kissing Eltsin, Patriarch of Moscow Alexi II and Slobodan Miloshevic), it seems that Putin has avoided kissing Lukashenka. Lukashenka’s popularity is partly due to his reputation as a fighter against corruption. As chairman of the parliamentary committee investigating corruption he was the key figure behind the doubtful accusations which led to the fall of President of Parliament Shushkievich. In his election campaign Lukashenka also emphasized his struggle against corruption and made numerous populist promises. The independent Russian newspaper “Moskovskie novosti” (“Moscow news”) compared Lukashenka with the Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

As time passes, Lukashenka’s rule becomes increasingly dictatorial. In November 94 he creates what he calls the “presidential vertical line” – the heads of six regions and 118 districts of the republic who are directly subordinate to the president. The presidential representatives are delegated virtually all the powers of the local authorities. The elected bodies – the local soviets – are thus practically deprived of power and replaced by the president.

From December 25 – 30, 1994 numerous newspapers have to be issued with “blank areas”. These blanks replace a speech given in parliament by the deputy Antoncyk on the topic of corruption within the president’s team. At the time this speech is debated in parliament. Independent newspapers which dare to publish the text of the speech are banned from using the state printing works.

In the first months of his presidency Lukasenka repeatedly proves his negative attitude towards Belarusian history, culture and language and towards a nationally oriented policy. He declares, for example, that Belarusian is a “poor” language unable to express any “great things” and that there are only two “great” languages in the world: Russian and English. With such statements he puts the nationally oriented intelligentsia against himself.

On April 11, 1995 Lukashenka speaks in parliament, proposing to call a referendum in order to replace the national symbols – the white-red-white flag and the national crest “Pahonia” – by the old, Soviet symbols (without hammer and sickle), to give Russian the status of official language (along with Belarusian), to pursue economic integration with Russia and to give the president the power to dissolve parliament. The democratic opposition accuses Lukashenka of violating the constitution, 18 deputies – members of the BNF party and other parties of the democratic opposition – declare a hunger strike and remain in the parliament building overnight in protest against the president’s plans. During the night of April 11th to 12th these 18 deputies are attacked, beaten up and driven out of the building by about 200 masked men belonging to the presidential bodyguard.

Stanislau Shushkevich, the deputy speaker of the Supreme Soviet – a former member of the communist party, but not a member of the nomenclature – was elected president of parliament and thus became the first head of state of the new “Respublika Belarus”.

Stanislau Shushkevich – Belarus parliament chairman (1991-94)

On December 8, 1991 the Commonwealth of Independent States was founded and soon afterwards the Soviet Union was dissolved. Belarus, whose fate had long been decided by other powers, now had a chance to build its own future.

In the beginning both the government and the opposition sought to build on the great history of the Belarusian people which had been interrupted by its annexation by Tsarist Russia and later the Soviet Union. But in contrast to the other new republics, the population in Belarus showed very little reaction to such policies. The country had been dominated by Russia for so long that most people had got used to it and had even stopped considering themselves a nation in its own right. Apart from these psychological problems, the population was suffering from very practical, economic problems, so that the government’s attempts to create a feeling of national consciousness appeared grotesque to many people.

Shushkevich took a moderate stance. His father, a writer, had spent seventeen years of his life in punishment camps during the Stalin era. Shushkevich himself, a nuclear physicist whom the Chernobyl disaster had induced to go into politics, was opposed to Moscow’s continual interference into Belarusian affairs and had always emphasised the country’s historical roots – particularly the “Golden Age” of Belarusian history between the 16th and late 18th century (For more details about this part of Belarusian history, see History of Belarus . On his first visit to the United Nations Organisation in New York, Shushkevich even brought a copy of the Statute of the Grand Duchy of Litva (1529) with him as a present.

But even though Belarus was now an independent country, there had been no elections and the Supreme Soviet was still the “old” one which had been elected under Soviet law. In early 1992 the opposition therefore started to collect signatures for a referendum on the issue of new elections. The opposition argued that the old communist parliament would not carry out the necessary reforms and would not establish democracy. The campaign was extremely successful. For the first time, the democratic opposition had managed to shake the population up out of its traditional passivity – not only the population of the capital, but of the whole country -and make them take part in the discussion about the future of the country. On April 13 the democrats had collected 383 000 valid signatures, 33 000 more than required by law. However, the Supreme Soviet declared the campaign illegal due to “severe violation of the law” and refused to hold a referendum. Instead, it was agreed to hold elections in March 1994, a year earlier than planned (a promise which was not kept). In an interview with Radio Free Europe Shushkevich justified this decision, arguing that the deputies should be given the chance to do their duty and pass a new electoral law and a new constitution.

The Belarusian state symbols at the Government building in Minsk (until 14 May 1995)

Since he had not been elected by the people, Shushkevich was in a weak position, dependent on a parliament which was the most conservative one of the three Slavic CIS states. So the moderate politician Shushkevich was increasingly pressurized by conservative forces in parliament and in the government of Prime Minister Viacheslau Kiebich. These conservative forces held Shushkevich partly responsible for the dissolution of the Soviet Union and for the country’s economic crisis which had begun afterwards.

In July 1993 a vote of no confidence against the Shushkevich failed, but on January 26, only a few days after Bill Clinton had visited Belarus and praised Shushkevich for his merits, the Supreme Soviet voted him out of office (209 to 36 votes). The minister of the interior and several leading KGB figures were dismissed at the same time. The formal cause for this was the President’s approval of the extradition of two former leaders of the Lithuanian KGB who had attempted to carry out a putsch in Vilnius (Vilnia) in January 1991 and had been hiding in Belarus since. Two days after Shushkevich’s removal from office the Lieutenant General of the militia and chairman of the parliamentary committee for national security, Miechyslau Hryb, was elected President of Parliament and Head of State.

On March 15, 1994, after endless discussions and debate, parliament passed the new Belarusian constitution. The constitution defines Belarus as a democratic and constitutional unitary state which guarantees its citizens all basic liberties, such as the right to private property, health care and education. The right to participation in the political process is guaranteed by free and direct elections of national and local politicians. The legislative power is exercised by the Supreme Soviet, which is elected for a period of five years. It consists of 260 seats and has a number of permanent committees which draw up bills and monitor the work of the government. The new constitution was also the last one of all those passed in other former Soviet republics to introduce the office of president. The Belarusian president, who is elected directly by the people every five years, has extensive powers similar to the Russian president. International treaties and national laws can only become effective with the approval of the president. He is the head of the executive, he institutes the government and is commander-in-chief of the army.

On June 25, 1989 the Belarusian Popular Front, which became the main opposition party, was founded. It was given the name of “Adradzennie”, meaning “rebirth”. Due to resistance by the authorities, the founding convention had to take part in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius (Vilnia). Among the founding fathers of the new party were well-known personalities, such as the writers Vasil’ Bykau and Alies’ Adamovich. As its main objectives, the new party sought to achieve a revival of Belarusian national consciousness and to reveal the truth about the atrocities committed by the Stalinist regime in Belarus. Zianon Pazniak, a key figure within the movement and its leader today, was instrumental in investigating the mass executions carried out in Kurapaty near Minsk in 1937 – 1941 (see also Kurapaty Homepage). In 1988 he discovered what was left of the mass graves where the victims of the mass executions had been buried. This discovery – the final proof of deliberate genocide – made another major impact on the Belarusian population.

Nevertheless the Belarusian opposition remained of little influence. It was subject to permanent repression and smear campaigns on the part of the communist party. Unlike the Russian communist party, the Belarusian communists remained a united and powerful body up to the summer of 1991. As a consequence they still obtained about 86% of the vote in the parliamentary elections on March 13, 1990, whereas the “Adradzennie” candidates and other democratic candidates only won 32 out of 360 seats.

On July 27, 1990 – following endless debate in the Belarusian Supreme Soviet – Belarus declared its sovereignty. But even after that Minsk failed to take advantage of the weak position the central Soviet government was in. In reality the Belarusian leadership still sought to revive the Soviet Union. Later, when the treaty establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States was negotiated, Belarus was the only one of the former Soviet republics which did not propose any amendments. In contrast to Russia and Ukraine, the Belarusian declaration of independence did not mention the principle of equality for all parties and political movements. In Belarus the communist party continued to play the dominant role in the state and was ready to defend its position.
Demonstration in support of Belarusian independence, Minsk, 1989 – End of Soviet Era
Only months later, in April 1991, the situation began to change. The Soviet government had raised the prices for food, which led to large-scale protest among the population. The independent trade unions called several strikes, so that public life in Minsk virtually came to a standstill for several days. More than a hundred thousand people took to the streets, demanding not only a higher standard of life but also the resignation of the Belarusian government, an end to Soviet rule, free elections and Belarusian independence.